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Abstract
This note considers the provision of incentives in public organizations that face the following
three constraints. First, no lateral entry is possible. Second, the outside opportunities of
bureaucrats are independent of their performance. Third, the organization cannot design
incentive schemes with stochastic wage bills. In our incentive scheme., the organization
contains three jobs. Every period, the organization recruits two agents for the ``field" jobs. At
the end of the period, one agent is put in retirement and the other is promoted to the
``executive" job. An agent will be promoted if he has obtained the highest performance on
the managerial aspects of the ``field" job, and has passed an endogenous standard of
performance on the technical aspects of this ``field" job. This system (1) provides incentives
for optimal efforts in the ``field" job AND (2) improves on a purely random allocation
system of the “executive”. There are problems of time consistency, though.
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This paper is concerned with the provision of incentives in the subset of public
organizations that face the following three constraints.
First, the “executive” levels1 in the hierarchy can only be occupied by people
with previous experience as “ﬁeld managers”. Thus, no lateral entry is possible.
Second, because of the speciﬁcity of the tasks executed “on the ﬁeld”, the
outside opportunities of bureaucrats are independent of their performance as
“ﬁeld manager” (see Williamson [19, p. 326]).
Third, the organization faces a ﬁxed budget, and can therefore not design
incentive schemes such that the total wage bill depends stochastically on per-
formance.
As suggested by Rose-Ackerman [18], this third constraint implies that in-
centives should be provided by the prospect of promotion to a better paid job
inside a predetermined hierarchical structure.
We will therefore propose the following incentive scheme. The organization
contains three jobs: one “executive” job, and two “ﬁeld” jobs. Every period, the
organization recruits two agents for the “ﬁeld” jobs. At the end of the period,
one agent is put in retirement and the other is promoted to the “executive”
job (and the agent who previously held this post is now put in retirement).
An agent will be promoted if he has obtained the highest performance on the
managerial aspects of the “ﬁeld” job, and has passed some endogenous standard
of minimal performance on the technical aspects of this “ﬁeld” job (in a sense
to be made precise below).
We will show below that the system we describe here (1) provides the neces-
sary incentives for optimal eﬀorts in the “ﬁeld” job AND (2) reveals a signal of
the agents’ ability as “executives” and therefore improves on a purely random
promotion system.
We have thus an incentive scheme that is, on the one hand, purely intern to
the organization and that, on the other hand, takes into account the problem
of the organization’s hierarchy - neither “pure” tournament theory nor “pure”
career concern models allow to tackle both problems simultaneously (see Burgess
and Metcalfe [3, p. 26]).
2 The model
Let the “executive” job be denoted by H, and the two “ﬁeld” jobs by L. Let
the agents be labeled i = 1,2. In his “ﬁeld” job, agent i executes two types of
tasks, a managerial (denoted M) and a technical (denoted T). Let the tasks be
labeled j = M,T.
The eﬀort devoted on each task j, aij ≥ 0, is unobservable.
However, at the end of the period, the organization observes a signal αiT for
the technical task:
1Following the terminology used in Wilson’s classic work on bureaucracy [20], this refers
to the top levels in the hierarchy.
1αiT = aiT + θiT (1)
θiT is a stochastic variable, which can reﬂect both measurement errors and
fundamental diﬀerences in abilities across the agents - this distinction does not
matter for the technical task. We will assume that it is possible to measure
performance on the technical task according to a cardinal scale, and that θiT
has a density that is deﬁned for θiT > 0 only. Therefore, it is impossible to
observe αiT < 0. θ1T and θ2T are distributed independently.
Similarly, at the end of the period, the organization observes signals αiM for
the managerial task:
αiM = aiM + ηiM + iM (2)
We assume that ηiM ∼ N(0,σ2
η) and that iM ∼ N(0,σ2
). Thus, both terms
are distributed identically across agents. We also assume that ηiM and iM are
independent.
While iM is a “pure noise” term, ηiM will be interpreted as a talent that is
speciﬁc to the agent. Therefore, although it is unknown to the agents and the
organization before eﬀort has been undertaken, it is assumed to remain constant
after αiM has been observed.
This interpretation of ηiM and iM is coherent with what is usual in “career
concern” models [1, 5, 9].
The organization pays a ﬁxed wage wH to the promoted agent.
The organization’s beneﬁts from the two jobs are separable.
If agent i gets promoted, then the organization’s gross beneﬁts from the
“executive” job depend, on the one hand, on the agent’s eﬀort levels in period 2
and, on the other hand, on the agent’s managerial talent ηiM. Eﬀort in period
2 depends on a complex array of non-contractible terms (an agent’s own beliefs
and personal motivation, fear of public disclosure of possible incompetence, peer
pressure, social conditioning in the ﬁrst period, etc) and is left exogenous here.2
Therefore, in the second period, we can denote the organization’s gross beneﬁts
by BPH(ηiM), and the organization’s net payoﬀ is: BPH(ηiM)−wH. Of course,
we assume that dBPH
dηiM > 0.
The agent who gets promoted obtains net beneﬁts wH+BH(.) where BH are
the net non-monetary beneﬁts he receives from the “executive” job; if he is put
in retirement, he gets his total beneﬁts Br from leisure and pension payments.
Following Meyers [13], the agent commits to accept a proposed promotion.
Let us now consider the “ﬁeld” job. The organization’s expected gross bene-
ﬁts from agent i’s eﬀort are : BPL (aiM,aiT). Again, we assume that the agents
get a ﬁxed wage wL. The agents’ gross beneﬁt from eﬀort in the “ﬁeld” job is
assumed to be independent of the agents’ talent BL (aiM,aiT) - there is thus
perfect ex ante symmetry between the agents.
To simplify notation, let W1 ≡ wH + BH and W2 ≡ Br. The expected
discounted value of agent i’s period 2 payoﬀ is W ≡ δ (PiW1 + (1 − Pi)W2),
2This idea is now commonly accepted in models of bureaucratic behavior - see for instance
Besley and Ghatak [2], Francois [7] and Williamson [19].
2where Pi is the probability that agent i gets promoted and δ is the discount
rate (assumed the same for all agents). We shall describe below the rules of the
game that determine Pi.
As in Prendergast [17, p. 22] and conventional “career concern” models
[5, 9], we assume that the agents are risk neutral in order to emphasize the
behavioral responses.
For agent i, his expected payoﬀs at the beginning of his employment are :
Bi = wL + BL (aiM,aiT) + δ (PiW1 + (1 − Pi)W2). (3)
Let us now specify the “rules of the game”.
The organization compares the performance of the agents in their manage-
rial task (thus, it holds a “tournament” with respect to this task). This type
of incentive scheme is appropriate if the absolute levels of performance are not
public information, and therefore not legally enforceable (see for instance Mal-
comson [12] for a detailed argument), which seems plausible for a rather vague
task as “management”.
However, the organization must also provide incentives for eﬀort on the
technical task. Therefore, in order to enter the tournament on the managerial
task (subjective evaluation) and have a chance to get the “executive” job, agents
must ﬁrst perform well in the technical task. As performance in the technical
task can be measured according to a cardinal scale, it is possible to contract
upon the absolute value of performance. Therefore, to perform well means that
αiT ≥ T∗, where T∗ is a performance standard determined by the organization.
Three cases are possible:
• Both agents perform well on the technical task: α1T ≥ T∗ and α2T ≥ T∗.
Both agents enter the tournament on the managerial task and the agent
with the highest value of αiM wins the “executive” job.
• Both agents perform badly on the technical task: α1T < T∗ and α2T < T∗.
As lateral entry is impossible and somebody must be promoted to the
“executive” job, we assume that both agents will be allowed to enter the
tournament on the managerial task to win the “executive” job. As the
agents know the rule of the game, they can anticipate that the tournament
is the same whether or not both of them meet the required T∗. As there is
no repeated interaction between the agents, we can however safely assume
that they cannot collude to fail to meet T∗.
• If one agent performs well and the other poorly, then there is no managerial
tournament, and the organization promotes the agent i for whom αiT ≥
T∗.
The organization is able to commit itself to this scheme.
Now note that: P (αiT ≥ T∗) = 1−GT (T∗ − aiT), where GT is the cumula-
tive distribution function of θiT. To simplify notation, let GiT = GT (T∗ − aiT).
3Similarly, P (α1M > α2M) = GM (a1M − a2M), where GM is the cumulative
distribution function of η2M + 2M − η1M − 1M, which is normally distributed









P1 = [1 − G1T][1 − G2T]GM + G1TG2TGM + [1 − G1T]G2T.
and P2 = 1 − P1.
3 The interaction between the agents
Let us ﬁrst turn to the agents’ problem. First note that all period 2 elements in
the agents’ payoﬀ function are exogenous in this model. The only decision
variables are the period 1 eﬀort levels, which only aﬀect period 2’s payoﬀs
through the probability of getting promoted.
Following the standard approach in moral hazard problems, we assume that
the organization wants to induce a positive amount of eﬀort. Therefore, we















= g1T [2G2TGM (.) − G2T − GM (.)] (5)
∂P2
∂a2T
= −g2T [1 + 2G1TGM (.) − G1T − GM (.)] (6)
and (where giM =
∂GM(a1M−a2M)













= giM (1 + 2G1TG2T − G1T − G2T) (7)
Suppose now that there exists a symmetric, interior Nash equilibrium be-
tween the agents: a1j = a2j = aj > 0. If this is the case, then GM (a1M − a2M) =
1
2 and GT (T∗ − a1T) = GT (T∗ − a2T).
Substituting this in (5) and (6) yields ∂Pi
∂aT = −1
2gT. Therefore, agent i’s





δWgT = −bT (8)
Similarly, (7) simpliﬁes to: ∂Pi
∂aM = giM (2GT (GT − 1) + 1) and the FOC









(2GT (GT − 1) + 1) = −bM (9)
We shall assume here that the second order conditions for the agents are
satisﬁed.
4 The optimal contract
Total expected surplus at the beginning of the game is
2 X
i=1











On the one hand, the FOCs for the ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels in the ﬁrst period
are given by:
∂BPL(.)
∂aT = −bT and
∂BPL(.)
∂aM = −bM. On the other hand, the sur-
plus in the second period does not depend on the eﬀort levels in the ﬁrst period,
but only on the talent of the agent who gets selected. Given the symmetry of
the problem, both agents face the same ex ante probability of getting promoted.
Therefore, the problem for the organization is: choose wL, W1, W2 and T∗
such that the organization’s expected surplus is maximized, taking into account
the agents’ incentive compatibility and participation constraints.
As the agent’s talent is organization-speciﬁc, we do not need to take into
account his participation constraint in the second period, but only his prior
participation constraint.
It is then absolutely straightforward to verify that W1 and T∗ can be chosen
to induce the ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels, while wL and W2 will then be used to
satisfy the participation constraint. This result should not surprise us: it has
been shown before that with risk neutral agents, the ﬁrst-best can be obtained,
both with tournaments and with ﬁxed standards (see Lazear and Rosen [11]).
Moreover, as the organization can anticipate the equilibrium levels of eﬀort,
it also knows the value of ηiM+iM after the observation of αiM. Following stan-
dard arguments on Bayesian inference (see for instance Johnston [10, p.512]),


















Therefore, in a symmetric equilibrium E(η1M|α1M,aM) > E(η2M|α2M,aM)
if and only if α1M > α2M.
This implies immediately:
Proposition 1 If the principal can commit to his incentive scheme, then he
can induce the ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels in both tasks in the “ﬁeld” job. Moreover,
if both agents pass (or fail) the performance test on the technical task, then
he promotes the agent with the highest expected managerial ability, given the
equilibrium strategies and observed performance.
5There are basically two possible problems with this scheme.
First, it is possible that the player with the highest estimated talent does
not win the contest because he fails to pass the go/no go test. Therefore, we
have a problem of time consistency: the organization might end up promoting
the player with the lowest estimated talent.
Indeed, suppose that the organization cannot commit to its incentive scheme.
Then, in the only subgame perfect equilibrium with symmetric strategies, the
organization ignores the score on the technical task, promotes the agent with
the highest performance on the managerial task, and the agents undertake zero
eﬀort on the technical task.
However, as performance on the technical task is veriﬁable, there is a way
to circumvent this problem: the establishment of independent administrative
courts. If the organization does not fulﬁll its commitments, then a disadvantaged
agent can always sue the organization. Thus, administrative courts can be used
as commitment devices.
Taking into account the symmetry of the problem, the ex ante probabil-
ity that the organization would like to deviate from its commitment is π =
[1 − GT]GT. It is again straightforward to verify that the value of the per-
formance standard that minimizes π, taking into account the agents’ incentive
compatibility constraints, is T∗ = 0: let both agents always enter the managerial
tournament. As T∗ = 0 will, in general, not induce the ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels,
this shows clearly the conﬂict between providing incentives and minimizing the
risk of promoting the wrong agent.
This problem could of course be solved if “passing the test” on the technical
task would be rewarded with a premium in the second period, but without
interfering with the tournament on the managerial task. However, this would
again introduce stochasticity in the total wage bill for the organization.
Second, it is still possible that the organization does not promote the agent
with the highest talent. Let the probability of promoting agent 1 while agent 2
has the highest managerial talent be denoted by P(1|ˆ 2).
If no managerial tournament takes place, then P(1|ˆ 2) is simply the prior 1
2.
If the managerial tournament does take place, then, given the equilibrium
strategies: P(1|ˆ 2) = P (η1M + 1M > η2M + 2M|η2M > η1M). Let η = η1M −
η2M; this is normally distributed with zero mean and variance 2σ2
η. Let  =





As P (0 > η) = 1
2, we obtain that (using the normality and independence of
 and η):





























2ση = ρcosϑ and  √




















































∂(σ)2 < 0 and limσ→∞ P(1|ˆ 2) =
1
4. This is illustrated in Figure (1).
Therefore:
Proposition 2 The probability that the least talented agent gets promoted in-
creases in the variance of the “pure noise” term, and decreases in the variance
of the “hidden talent”. However, this probability is always lower than with a
purely random promotion system.
5 Areas for further research
We believe that the framework we have provided here is a more realistic descrip-
tion of the incentive issues public organizations face than either pure tournament
or pure career concern models.
However, in order to arrive at further insights, several extensions are neces-
sary.
First, following Lazear and Rosen’s seminal comparison of piece rates, tour-
naments and ﬁxed standards [11], we need to introduce prior diﬀerences in the
characteristics of the agents. We need to investigate in particular what this
implies with respect to the selection of public servants.
Second, public organizations sometimes do not even have the freedom to
determine their wage structure. If this is the case, then their only instrument is
the number of “executive” jobs compared to “ﬁeld” jobs. However, our model
considers an extremely simple hierarchy. In reality, there are also intermediate
levels. Clearly, an increase in the number of intermediate layers increases the
precision of the estimate of managerial ability (see Meyers [13]), but at a cost
(for instance, an increase in the number of layers of communication). An or-
ganization must also decide how to structure itself, for instance according to
functional or to regional lines.
Third, we have ignored the possibility of collusion (or, on the opposite, sab-
otage actions) between agents, or between diﬀerent layers inside the hierarchy.
Similarly, it could be useful to model the “social conditioning” that we have
assumed exogenous.
Finally, even if no lateral entry is possible, it is possible that agents still have
outside options that depend on their observed performance, at least if their tasks
also contain aspects that are valuable outside the organization.
7Figure 1: P (0 > η,η +  > 0) for 2σ2
η = 1 and 2σ2
 ∈ [0.5,20]
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